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Stephens Media v. Dist. Court,
125 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 63 (Dec. 24, 2009) 1
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—PRESS’S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF ACCESS TO
JUROR QUESTIONNAIRES
Summary
Review of a motion regarding two issues of first impression: (1) determining whether
petitioners met the proper procedure whereby the press may file a motion to intervene in a
criminal case when seeking access to juror questionnaires, and (2) whether district courts must
publicly disclose juror questionnaires.
Disposition/Outcome
The Court answered the first question by holding that the petitioners’ petition for
extraordinary writ relief in the form of either a writ of prohibition or a writ of mandamus was
proper only under the guise of a writ of mandamus so long as the legal issues were not moot.
The Court further held the legal issues in this case were not moot and therefore procedurally
proper when considered for review. The Court answered the second question in the positive by
concluding that the press presumptively has a First Amendment right of access to all criminal
proceedings (juror questionnaires included).
Factual and Procedural History
The September 8, 2008 scheduled criminal trial of Orenthal James Simpson and Charles
Stewart for various criminal offenses attracted a great deal of press coverage due to the notoriety
stemming from Simpson’s past criminal and civil trials for the murders of his ex-wife, Nicole
Simpson, and her lover, Ron Goldman. On September 3, 2008 the district court issued a
Decorum Order whereby the court forbade the media from publishing the name, address, or
description of any prospective juror. Additionally, the court’s Decorum Order provided for a
sample copy of the juror questionnaire only after a jury was seated for the case.
Stephens Media LLC dba Las Vegas Review Journal and The Associated Press
(collectively “the press”) filed an emergency application to intervene in regards to the Decorum
Order’s position on juror questionnaires. Specifically, the press sought access to a blank jury
questionnaire before oral voir dire, along with copies of questionnaires filled-out by those jurors
ultimately chosen to hear the case. The district court held a hearing in regard to the application
and summarily denied the press’s application to intervene, proposing that Nevada law forbids
intervention in criminal cases. Additionally, the district court dismissed the First Amendment
right to access juror questionnaires argument by stating that the potential for a tainted jury was
too great to warrant the press’s access. Specifically, the dictrict court feared that potential jurors
would view the blank juror questionnaire before voir dire and contrive answers to those
questions in order to position themselves on the jury. Furthermore, the district court disallowed
the press’s access to completed juror questionnaires because the district court promised jurors
that the juror questionnaires were under seal and therefore confidential. Subsequent to the
dismissal, the press challenged the district court’s decision by filing an emergency petition for
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writ of prohibition or mandamus. After the jury rendered its verdict, the district court released
redacted copies of the selected jury’s completed questionnaires.
Discussion
Initially, the Court defined writs of prohibition 2 and writs of mandamus 3 in order to better
classify the press’s challenge. Additionally, the Court described the potential for it issuing an
extraordinary writ “where there is not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy [at law].” 4
Procedural Determination
The Court described the press’s challenge as a request for an extraordinary writ of
mandamus, concluding that the only way to challenge a district court’s refusal to allow an
application for interference was through an extraordinary writ because the district court’s
determination was not an appealable order. Additionally, the Court held that a writ of
mandamus is only proper in review of cases with live controversies, and that if the legal issues
involved in an action were rendered moot by subsequent events then the Court had no power to
review the case. However, the Court held it can review a non-live controversy under these
circumstances: (1) if the issue will likely arise again, and (2) if the challenged action was too
brief in duration to encompass full litigation before its natural expiration.
Here, the Court found the specific controversy in this case would normally be considered
moot because the district court had already withheld the juror questionnaires from the press.
However, the Court still held review of this issue proper because (1) a contest where the media
demands access to juror questionnaires will likely arise again given the media’s inquisitive
nature into high-profile cases; and (2) the full constitutional implications of juror-questionnaireclosure is unlikely to be fully litigated before the expiration of voir dire proceedings.
Additionally, the Court noted that writs of mandamus are usually reviewed under a
manifest abuse of discretion standard; however, here, the court held that when the issue in an
action is drawing the line between unconditionally-protected speech and legitimately-regulated
speech, the standard of review is de novo.
Presumption of Full-Disclosure for Voir Dire Materials
The Court found that the First Amendment implicitly guarantees the public access to
criminal proceedings. As a proxy of the public, the press too is allowed access to criminal
proceedings. This right is historically recognized because criminal trials were open to the public
and open-jury selection is a part of American jurisprudence—concepts the colonists transported
from sixteenth-century England. Furthermore, the Court held that the First Amendment’s right
of access encompasses juror questionnaires because these questionnaires are merely used to
facilitate and expedite the voir dire process and are not a separate and distinct proceeding.
The Court held that jury questionnaires are presumptively subject to disclosure—this
presumption can only be overcome if the district court can articulate specific findings as to why
closure is necessary and narrowly tailored to protect countervailing interests to public access.
2

A writ of prohibition prevents a district court that is already performing judicial functions outside of its jurisdiction
from doing so. Sonia F. v. Dist. Ct., 125 Nev. ___, 215 P. 3d 705, 707 (2009).
3
A writ of mandamus “compel[s] the performance of an act which the law requires as a duty resulting from an
office or where discretion has been manifestly abused or exercised arbitrarily or capriciously.” Redeker v. Dist. Ct.
122 Nev. 164, 167, 127 P.3d 520, 522 (2006).
4
American Home Assurance Co. v. Dist. Ct., 122 Nev. 1229, 1234, 147 P.3d 1120, 1124 (2006).
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The Court specifically adopted the U.S. Supreme Court’s Press-Enterprise II balancing test, 5
which states that a district court may deny access to jury questionnaires only after it “(1) make[s]
specific findings, on the record, demonstrating that there is a substantial probability that the
defendant would be deprived of a fair trial by the disclosure of the questionnaires and (2)
consider[s] whether alternatives to total suppression of the questionnaires would have protected
the interest of the accused.” 6
A district court must therefore balance a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
a fair trial with the press’s First Amendment right of access. The Court noted the U.S. Supreme
Court’s position that because the Bill of Rights were not prioritized in any order of importance, it
is not appropriate for subsequent courts to prioritize them. This non-prioritization prevents the
Sixth Amendment from inherently outweighing the First Amendment in a balancing test.
The first prong of the Press-Enterprise II balancing test requires a district court to make
explicit findings to support its closure order along with a finding that there exists a substantial
probability that a defendant will be deprived of a fair trial if the press had access to the criminal
proceedings (in this case, questionnaires). The Nevada Supreme Court noted that the U.S.
Supreme Court was skeptical of prior restraint on speech based solely on the risk of unfair
prejudice to a jury pool. The Nevada Supreme Court adopted such skepticism, finding that every
high-profile case risks jurors prejudging a criminal defendant—the Court held such prejudgment
did not substantially deprive a defendant of a fair trial. Indeed, both Courts thought the press’s
continued presence could not prevent twelve people from faithfully carrying out their duty as
jurors. Here, the district court merely leveled a basic concern that jurors would not be candid if
they had a copy of a juror questionnaire prior to voir dire. The Court found this concern
insufficient to outweigh the First Amendment’s presumption of openness because the district
court made no specific findings of fact to support its order.
The second prong of the Press-Enterprise II balancing test requires a district court to
consider alternatives to closure before pursuing it. The Court held that the district court failed to
consider any alternatives before forbidding the press’s access to the questionnaires. However,
for the purposes of future decisions, the Court listed a few alternatives to blanket closure of a
blank juror questionnaire and a completed questionnaire.
As an alternative to forbidding public disclosure of a blank questionnaire, the Court
suggested that a district court judge remove a suspicious juror for cause if the judge truly feared
a juror was answering questions during voir dire falsely so as to ensure his seat on the jury.
As an alternative for forbidding public disclosure of a completed questionnaire, the Court
suggested that district court judges should forewarn all potential jurors that their statements made
during voir dire and in their questionnaires may be subject to public disclosure and any deeply
sensitive question may be asked and answered in camera with counsel present and on the record.
This in camera questioning will reduce the risk of unnecessary closure of voir dire proceedings
as only those deeply personal questions will be removed from public access due to privacy
concerns.
The Court also reviewed whether the redacted versions of the juror questionnaires the
district court gave to the press satisfied the balancing test. The Court held that the redacted
questionnaires did not satisfy the balancing test because the district court did not base its
redactions on any specific finding or discernible criteria.
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Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 14 (1986).
State ex rel. Beacon Journal v. Bond, 781 N.E.2d 180, 191 (Ohio 2002)
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Conclusion
The First Amendment encompasses the right of public access to criminal proceedings—
criminal proceedings include juror questionnaires. All criminal proceedings are presumptively
open to the public unless a court can document why a defendant would be deprived of a fair trial
because of such access, and the court considers less drastic alternatives to total suppression of
any document/proceeding. No blanket statement, generalization, or conjecture is capable of
outweighing the press’s First Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings.
.
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